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Abstract
Neuroscience research has examined separately how we detect human agents on the basis of their face and body (person
perception) and how we reason about their thoughts, traits or intentions (person knowledge). Neuroanatomically distinct
networks have been associated with person perception and person knowledge, but it remains unknown how multiple
features of a person (e.g. thin and kind) are linked to form a holistic identity representation. In this fMRI experiment, we
investigated the hypothesis that when encountering another person specialised person perception circuits would be
functionally coupled with circuits involved in person knowledge. In a factorial design, we paired bodies or names with
trait-based or neutral statements, and independent localiser scans identified body-selective and mentalising networks.
When observing a body paired with a trait-implying statement, functional connectivity analyses demonstrated that
body-selective patches in bilateral fusiform gyri were functionally coupled with nodes of the mentalising network. We
demonstrate that when forming a representation of a person circuits for representing another person’s physical
appearance are linked to circuits that are engaged when reasoning about trait-based character. These data support the view
that a ‘who’ system for social cognition involves communication between perceptual and inferential mechanisms when
forming a representation of another’s identity.
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Introduction
Appreciating the meaning of social interactions depends cru-
cially on understanding others’ identity. For example, one may
react differently to an embrace offered from a romantic partner
compared with a complete stranger. Attempts to understand
the neurocognitive mechanisms that underpin identity process-
ing have focused on two broad research topics: person percep-
tion and person knowledge. Person perception research
investigates how sensory systems detect conspecifics in the en-
vironment on the basis of their face and body (Peelen and
Downing, 2007), whereas person knowledge research investi-
gates how inferential mechanisms represent others’ mental
states, such as beliefs, desires and attitudes (Frith and Frith,
1999). However, little is currently known about the interaction
between social perception and knowledge systems in the
human brain. The current fMRI study uses functional connectiv-
ity analyses to investigate how distinct neural substrates are
linked when perceiving and reasoning about others.
Human neuroimaging studies have provided clear evidence
that the processes involved in person perception and person
knowledge recruit distinct neural circuits (Adolphs, 2009).
Fusiform gyri (FG) and occipitotemporal (OT) cortices respond
more to the perception of social (faces and bodies) compared
with non-social stimuli (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Downing et al.,
2001; Spiridon et al., 2006), and the majority of evidence suggests
that their contribution to understanding identity is restricted to
the processing of physical appearance, such as facial features,
body shape and posture (Kanwisher, 2010; Downing and Peelen,
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2011). A distinct brain circuit comprising medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), precuneus and
temporal poles (TPs) has been shown to respond when reason-
ing about others’ thoughts as well as when making character
judgments (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Mitchell, 2009; Schiller
et al., 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009). The ability to draw inferences
about underlying personal characteristics, such as whether
someone is hardworking, honest and friendly, also contributes
to understanding another’s identity (Ma et al., 2012; Macrae and
Quadflieg, 2010).
Although it is clear that perceptual and inferential brain cir-
cuits contribute to forming an identity representation (Haxby
et al., 2000; Mitchell et al., 2002; Todorov et al., 2007), and that
trait information can be associated with a person’s physical fea-
tures, such as their face (Cloutier et al., 2011; Mende-Siedlecki
et al., 2013), a fundamental question in neuroscience is how sig-
nals from such segregated neural systems are integrated
(Friston et al., 2003). Indeed, how integration occurs between the
neural representations of others’ physical features and more
elaborate cognitive processes remains unclear. For example,
functional claims have been made regarding body-selective
patches along the ventral visual stream that extend beyond vis-
ual analysis of body shape and posture, to include embodiment
(Arzy et al., 2006), action goals (Marsh et al., 2010) and aesthetic
perception (Calvo-Merino et al., 2010). However, the engagement
of body-selective cortical patches in these more elaborate cogni-
tive processes may, in part, index functional coupling within a
distributed neural network, rather than local processing alone
(Ramsey et al., 2011). Our primary focus in the current experi-
ment, therefore, is to test the hypothesis that body patches
along the ventral visual stream do not work alone when per-
ceiving and reasoning about others, but interact with extended
neural networks.
Prominent models of functional integration in the human
brain involve distributed but reciprocally connected neural pro-
cessing architectures (Mesulam, 1990; Fuster, 1997; Friston and
Price, 2001). For example, extended brain networks involving for-
ward and backward connections have been proposed for visual
perception of faces (Fairhall and Ishai, 2007), bodies (Ewbank et al.,
2011), and objects (Bar, 2004; Mechelli et al., 2004). Furthermore,
when forming identity representations, person perception signals
from posterior regions have been proposed to interact with person
inference signals from a more anterior circuit (Haxby et al., 2000;
Ramsey et al., 2011; Collins and Olson, 2014).
To date, however, there is little empirical evidence demon-
strating interplay between brain systems for person perception
and person knowledge. Thus, the current experiment investi-
gates the hypothesis that the representation of identity com-
prises a distributed but connected set of brain circuits, spanning
perceptual and inferential processes. To investigate this hy-
pothesis, we collected functional imaging data while partici-
pants were observing two different depictions of an agent
(bodies or names) paired with different types of social know-
ledge (trait-based or neutral). Participants were asked to form
an impression of the people they observed. The manipulation of
social knowledge replicated prior work that has compared de-
scriptions of behaviour that imply specific traits to those where
no trait-based inference can be made (Mitchell, 2009; Cloutier
et al., 2011; Kuzmanovic et al., 2012; Ma et al., 2012). In addition,
by including two forms of social agent, we are able to investi-
gate the brain circuits that link person knowledge to a specific
aspect of a person (physical bodily features), rather than other
aspects of a person, which do not engage person perception
neural networks, such as a name. By manipulating social agent
stimuli and social knowledge information we test a model sys-
tem of how person perception and person knowledge processes
interact in the human brain. We hypothesise that brain circuits
involved in person perception and person knowledge will show
increased functional connectivity when seeing another person
(rather than reading a name) and learning something about his
or her trait-based character (rather than trait-neutral informa-
tion). We expected such tuning to manifest in terms of (i) the
magnitude of response observed in body-selective and Theory-
of-Mind (ToM) networks, and (ii) the functional connectivity be-
tween these networks. This pattern of results would show that
when trait inferences are linked to bodies, there is a functional
connection between brain regions involved in the visual ana-
lysis of body shape and those that are involved in inferring trait
inferences and attributing mental states more generally.
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty-three participants were recruited from the Bangor com-
munity and received a monetary reimbursement of £10. All par-
ticipants had normal or correct-to-normal vision and reported
no history of neurological damage. They gave informed consent
according to the local ethics guidelines. One participant was
excluded from data analysis because of a scanner malfunction
whilst another was excluded due to difficulties understanding
the task. The remaining 21 participants (13 females; mean6SD
age: 24.665.7 years) were included in subsequent analyses. For
three of these participants, two sessions from the main task
had to be removed due to excessive head motion displacement
above 3 mm.
Stimuli and experimental procedure
Participants completed three tasks during scanning: the main ex-
perimental task, a body-localiser and a ToM localiser (details of
each task are provided below). Each participants’ scanning ses-
sion started with a run of the body-localiser (4.5 min), followed by
two runs of the main task (6 min and 50 s each). This task se-
quence was then repeated a second time. The body-localiser was
interspersed within runs of the main task to introduce a more
varied experience for participants and offset boredom. Finally,
participants completed two runs of the ToM-localiser (4.5 min
each). The ToM-localiser was always presented after the main
task, to ensure that participants were not primed towards mak-
ing trait inferences during the main task. Stimuli were presented
using a desktop PC and Matlab software with Psychtoolbox
(www.psychtoolbox.org).
Main experimental task. The main task comprised an event-
related factorial design. In each trial, participants were pre-
sented concurrently with a social agent (body or name) and
social knowledge (trait-based or neutral) (Figure 1). This resulted
in four conditions: bodies paired with traits (BodiesTraits) or
neutral statements (BodiesNeutral), and names paired with
traits (NamesTraits) or neutral statements (NamesNeutral). For
each participant, bodies and names were randomly assigned to
the statements. Thus, there was no systematic relationship be-
tween particular bodies/names and statements across partici-
pants, which removes any coupling between low-level stimulus
artefacts and any one condition in our design.
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for
500 ms, followed by the simultaneous presentation of an agent
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and a statement for 5000 ms. Participants were instructed to
pay attention to both the person (body or name) as well as to
the knowledge that they would receive about that person (trait
or neutral). There were 256 trials within the entire experiment
(64 per condition) that were spread over 4 separate functional
runs of equal length. In each functional run, trials were pre-
sented in four segments containing a counterbalanced se-
quence of trials from all four experimental conditions. In order
to help effectively model the influence of different events on
BOLD signal, one can either introduce jitter between events, or
counterbalance the conditions (Josephs and Henson, 1999). We
counterbalanced the trial order so that within each segment,
each condition was preceded equally often by all conditions
(Wager and Nichols, 2003; Aguirre, 2007). To provide a com-
pletely balanced trial ‘history’ across conditions, each segment
of 16 trials began with a ‘starter trial’, which was not included in
the data analysis. Subsequently, four further trials from each
condition were presented in a counterbalanced manner. There
was a 5-s rest period at the end of each segment.
To make sure participants paid attention to all aspects of the
stimuli, at the end of each block they were asked a yes/no-ques-
tion about the previous trial. Participants were given a response
box, which they held with both hands. Within a maximum dur-
ation of 5 s, yes/no responses were made by pressing the left
and right button, respectively. These questions could be about
the agent’s gender (was this person a man/woman?), body (was
this person facing forward?), name (was there an a/o in this
name?), as well as the person knowledge statements (did this
person touch an object? did this person have a positive/negative
attitude?). To ensure that participants remained alert to all
elements of these stimuli, the content of questions could not be
predicted. Accuracy was measured as the percentage of correct
answers and compared to chance performance (50%) using 95%
confidence intervals (CI.95; Cumming, 2014). Effect size was cal-
culated using Cohen’s d by dividing the mean difference from
chance performance by the standard deviation pooled across
conditions (Cohen, 1992; Lakens, 2013).
Social agent stimuli comprised images of bodies or names.
The agent (body: full-colour picture, 300 750 pixels; name:
black fontcolour, fontsize 60 pt) was presented in the middle of
the screen with text (fontsize 30 pt) underneath (250 pixels
below the centre of the screen). Pictures of 128 bodies (64
females) were selected that had an emotionally-neutral posture
(i.e. crossed-arms or slouching postures were not included) but
varied in terms of body shape, skin colour and clothing.
Consistent with prior work (Downing et al., 2007), in order to tar-
get regions selective for images of bodies and not faces, images
were cropped so the head was not visible. 128 Scandinavian
names (64 females), such as Sverre and Alfhild, were selected to
avoid associations with familiar names of people participants
may know (Ma et al., 2012). Each body and name was only
shown once during the entire experiment, to avoid any possible
effects of combining the same person with different social
knowledge statements over the course of the experiment.
Social knowledge stimuli comprised 128 statements that
were adapted from Mitchell et al. (2006) to convey either trait-
based (positive and negative) or neutral information. An ex-
ample of a trait-implying statement is ‘He cut in front of the
man in line’, implying the person is inconsiderate, whereas a
neutral example is ‘She walked through the swivel doors’. Trait
and neutral sentences did not differ (as tested with a paired-
samples t-test) in the mean amount of words [t(63)¼ 0.59,
P¼ 0.56], nor in the amount of characters [t(63)¼ 1.69, P¼ 0.09].
Each statement (64 trait, 64 neutral) was presented twice during
the experiment (once in female and once in male form; e.g. ‘She
walked . . . ’ and ‘He walked . . . ’).
Functional localisers. To localise body-selective brain regions we
used an established paradigm (Downing et al., 2007; http://
pages.bangor.ac.uk/pss811/page7/page7.html). We presented
12-s blocks of cars and of whole bodies (without heads) that
were not used in the main task. A run started with a blank
Fig. 1. Design and presentation of the stimuli. (A) A social agent (body or name)
was paired with social knowledge (trait-based or neutral). (B) In an event-related
design, stimuli were presented for 5 s and separated by a fixation cross for
500 ms. Each block ended with a question about the last trial the participants
saw.
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screen for 14 s, followed by two alternations of each condition.
This was repeated a second time, and followed by a final rest
period of 14 s. Each image was presented for 600 ms, followed by
a blank screen for 100 ms. Twice during each block, the same
image was presented two times in a row. Participants had to
press a button whenever they detected this immediate repeti-
tion (1-back task). The image location was slightly jittered (10
pixels around central fixation dot) to prevent participants from
performing the 1-back task based on low-level after-effects
from the previous image. Each participant completed two runs
of this task, each with a complementary order of conditions (if
run 1 started with bodies, run 2 would start with cars).
To localise brain regions that respond to mental state rea-
soning, we used an established ToM-localiser (Dodell-Feder
et al., 2011; http://saxelab.mit.edu/superloc.php). Participants
read 10 short false belief stories, in which the characters have
false beliefs about the state of the world. Participants also read
10 false photograph stories, where a photograph, map or sign
has out-dated or misleading information. After reading each
story, participants had to answer whether the subsequently
presented statement was true or false. Each run started with a
12-s rest period, after which the stories and questions were pre-
sented for 14 s combined (stories: 10 s; questions: 4 s), and were
separated by a 12-s rest period. The order of items and condi-
tions is identical for each subject. In the first run, stimuli 1–5
from each condition were presented. The remaining stimuli
were presented during the second run.
For both the body and ToM localiser, a design matrix was
fitted for each participant with three regressors, two for each
condition (bodies and cars; false beliefs and false photographs)
and one for the rest periods. Body-selective regions were
revealed by contrasting bodies and cars (Bodies>Cars). The
ToM-network was revealed by contrasting false beliefs with
false photographs (False Beliefs> False Photographs).
Data Acquisition
The experiment was conducted on a 3 Tesla scanner (Philips
Achieva), equipped with an eight-channel SENSE-head coil.
Stimuli were projected on a screen behind the scanner, which
participants viewed via a mirror mounted on the head-coil. T2*-
weighted functional images were acquired using a gradient-
echo echo-planar imaging sequence. An acquisition time of
2000 ms was used (image resolution: 3.03 3.03 4 mm3,
TE¼ 30, flip angle¼ 90). After the functional runs were com-
pleted, a high-resolution T1-weighted structural image was
acquired for each participant (voxel size¼ 1 1 1 mm3,
TE¼ 3.8 ms, flip angle¼ 8, FoV¼ 288 232 175 mm3). Four
dummy scans (4 2000 ms) were routinely acquired at the start
of each functional run and were excluded from analysis.
Data pre-processing and analysis
Data were pre-processed and analysed using SPM8 (Wellcome
Trust Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK: www.fil.
ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Functional images were realigned,
unwarped, corrected for slice timing, and normalised to the MNI
template with a resolution of 3 3 3 mm and spatially
smoothed using an 8-mm smoothing kernel. Head motion was
examined for each functional run and a run was not analysed
further if displacement across the scan exceeded 3 mm.
Univariate model and analysis. Each trial was modelled from
the onset of the body/name and statement for a duration of 5 s.
A design matrix was fitted for each participant with 6 regressors,
one for each condition of the 2 2 factorial design (4 in total), one
for the discarded starter trials and one for the question at the
end of each block. Main effects of social agent (Bodies>Names:
BodiesTraitsþBodiesNeutral>NamesTraitsþNamesNeutral) and
social knowledge (Traits>Neutral: BodiesTraitsþNamesTraits>
BodiesNeutralþNamesNeutral) were evaluated to help demon-
strate that our task engaged body-selective and ToM areas,
respectively. We also evaluated the interaction of bodies and trait
information to test our primary hypothesis [(BodiesTraits>
BodiesNeutral)> (NamesTraits>NamesNeutral)].
Response magnitude analyses. To test the magnitude-based predic-
tion, we calculated which brain regions showed a greater response
for trait inferences (Traits>Neutral) when observing a body com-
pared with reading a name. Two possible forms of interaction are
predicted: (i) the effect of social knowledge (Traits>Neutral) will
be present for both social agents, but be greater for bodies than
names; (ii) the effect of social knowledge (Traits>Neutral) will be
present for bodies, but not names. To help distinguish among pos-
sible interaction patterns, we exclusively mask our interaction re-
sult by (NamesNeutral>NamesTraits). Exclusive masking in this
manner makes sure that any interaction result is not produced by
an unpredicted preference for neutral over trait-based informa-
tion when paired with names.
Psychophysiological interaction analysis. To test our hypothesis
that body-selective cortical regions functionally couple with re-
gions associated with mentalising when one sees a body and
also infers a trait from it, we assessed the relationship between
these regions using a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) ana-
lysis (Friston et al., 1997). PPI enables the identification of brain
regions whose activity correlates with the activity of a seed re-
gion as a function of a task. Here we used a generalised form of
PPI, which allows for comparisons across the complete design
space, including more than two conditions (McLaren et al.,
2012). By doing so, it is possible to see whether any voxels
across the brain show a correlation with activity in the seed re-
gion (the ‘physiological element’) as a function of the four con-
ditions within the main task (the ‘psychological’ element).
Our hypothesis was that the same parts of the person percep-
tion and person knowledge networks, which show a magnitude-
based sensitivity to observing others and inferring traits (revealed
in the univariate interaction analysis), would also show func-
tional coupling with each other. As such, seed regions for the PPI
analysis were defined based on results from the univariate ana-
lysis. Two steps were taken to define seed regions (Figure 2A).
First, based on the group-level random-effects univariate ana-
lysis, we identified any clusters of overlap between (i) regions in
which the type of social agent and social knowledge interacted in
the predicted way (in the main experiment) and (ii) either body-
selective or ToM-selective regions as identified in the functional
localisers. Second, where such clusters of overlap were identified
at the group-level, we identified regions of overlap using the
same approach in each individual participant. This approach
allows us to identify with best possible resolution the key regions
where these two phenomena concur. Therefore, regions identi-
fied in this manner respond to one of the localisers (Body or
ToM), as well as the interaction term in the main task.
In the analyses performed at the single-subject level, we
searched for overlap across a range of thresholds, which is com-
mon when identifying seed regions in individual’s data (Spunt
and Lieberman, 2012; Klapper et al., 2014; Paulus et al., 2014). For
each seed region, therefore, we report how many participants
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show overlap between the interaction term in the main task
(across a range of thresholds) and functional localisers at a fixed
threshold [P< .005, voxel-extent (k)¼ 10]. Volumes were gener-
ated using a 6-mm sphere, which were positioned on each indi-
vidual’s seed-region peak.
PPI analyses were run for all seed regions that were identi-
fied in each participant. PPI models included the six regressors
from the univariate analyses, as well as six PPI regressors, one
for each of the four conditions of the factorial design, one for
the starter trial and question combined, and one that modelled
seed region activity. Although we used clusters emerging from
the univariate analysis to define seed regions for the PPI ana-
lysis, our PPI analysis is not circular (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009).
Because all regressors from the univariate analysis are included
within the PPI model as covariates of no interest (O’Reilly et al.,
2012), the PPI analyses are only sensitive to variance in addition
to that which is already explained by other regressors in the de-
sign (Figure 2B). Thus, the PPI analysis is statistically independ-
ent to the univariate analysis. Consequently, if clusters were
only co-active as a function of the interaction term from the
univariate task regressors, then we would not show any results
using the PPI interaction term. Any correlations observed be-
tween a seed region and a resulting cluster explains variance
above and beyond task-based activity as measured using a
standard univariate General Linear Model (GLM).
To create these PPI regressors, the time series in the seed re-
gion was specified as the first eigenvariate, and was conse-
quently deconvolved to estimate the underlying neural activity
(Gitelman et al., 2003). Then, the deconvolved time series was
multiplied by the predicted, pre-convolved time series of each
of the five conditions 4 main task conditions plus the combined
starter trial and question regressor. The resulting PPI for each
condition in terms of predicted ‘neural’ activity was then con-
volved with the canonical haemodynamic response function,
and the time series of the seed region was included as a covari-
ate of no interest (McLaren et al., 2012; Spunt and Lieberman,
2012; Klapper et al., 2014). At the second-level analysis, we
examined the same social agent*social knowledge interaction
term as described in the univariate analyses [(BodiesTraits>
BodiesNeutral)> (NamesTraits>NamesNeutral)].
Names and neutral statements functioned as control con-
ditions within our design. As such, names and neutral state-
ments were included to allow comparisons to bodies and
trait-diagnostic statements, and not because we had predic-
tions for how names or neutral information are represented
in terms of neural systems (see ‘Discussion’ section for more
details). Consequently, the (Names>Bodies), (Neutral>Trait)
and inverse interaction [(NamesTraits>NamesNeutral)>
(BodiesTraits>BodiesNeutral)] contrasts did not address our
main research question. Such contrasts, however, may be
useful in future meta-analyses and we therefore report re-
sults from these contrasts in Supplementary Table S1.
For all group-level analyses (univariate and connectivity-
based), images were thresholded using a voxel-level threshold
of P< 0.005 and a voxel-extent of 10 voxels (Lieberman and
Cunningham, 2009). Based on our hypotheses for functional
connections between person perception and person knowledge
networks, contrasts from the main task were inclusively
masked by the results from the functional localiser contrasts.
The results from these analyses are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
Results that survive correction for multiple comparisons at the
cluster level (Friston et al., 1994) using family-wise error (FWE)
correction (P< .05) are shown in bold font. To localise functional
responses we used the anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005).
Results
Behavioural data
During the main task, participants’ accuracy was assessed in
order to see whether they had been paying attention to the task.
Accuracy (percentage correct) in answering the yes/no-ques-
tions at the end of each block was above chance-level [M¼ 87.2,
CI.95 (82.75, 91.65), Cohen’s d¼ 3.81].
Fig. 2. Flow chart illustrating the steps to define seed regions and run PPI analyses. (A) Identification of seed regions in the univariate analysis was done at group and
single-subject level to allow for inter-individual differences in peak responses. (B) An illustration of the design matrix (this was the same for each run), that was created
for each participant. (C) The ‘psychological’ (task) and ‘physiological’ (time course from seed region) inputs for the PPI analysis.
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Neuroimaging data
Univariate analyses. Main effects. There was a main effect of so-
cial agent (Bodies>Names; Figure 3A) in bilateral OT cortices
[overlapping with Extrastriate Body Area (EBA) and surviving
FWE cluster correction] and bilateral FG [overlapping with
Fusiform Body Area (FBA) and surviving FWE cluster correction].
There was also a main effect of social knowledge
(Traits>Neutral; Figure 3B) in mPFC, bilateral TPs, precuneus,
and left TPJ, all of which overlapped with the ToM-localiser. The
inverse contrasts for both main effects (Names>Bodies and
Neutral>Trait) are reported in Supplementary Table S1.
Table 1. Results from the univariate analysis.
Region Number of voxels T Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates
x y z
a) Main effect Social Agent: Bodies>Names
Left occipitotemporal cortex 498 11.12 245 282 22
6.26 251 270 16
Right occipitotemporal cortex extending into fusiform gyrus 970 10.60 45 282 22
10.50 54 270 4
9.92 45 276 10
Left hippocampus 50 9.68 18 31 5
Right hippocampus 100 9.01 18 31 2
Right inferior temporal gyrus 173 7.23 33 4 44
5.87 30 4 35
5.59 24 4 23
Right inferior frontal gyrus 37 6.87 48 35 4
Right cuneus 60 5.64 21 79 43
4.74 21 261 58
Right inferior frontal gyrus 16 5.60 24 17 226
Right calcarine gyrus 11 5.41 21 294 22
Left fusiform gyrus 83 5.31 239 249 226
4.74 236 237 229
4.55 239 237 220
Striatum 27 5.27 3 11 217
Right inferior frontal gyrus 10 3.95 45 29 13
Left cerebellum 10 3.90 29 255 250
b) Main effect Social Knowledge: Traits>Neutral
Left temporal pole 698 11.43 251 11 226
10.08 254 21 223
9.23 245 26 214
Right temporal pole 510 10.88 51 11 235
8.68 60 24 220
7.63 51 213 220
Left medial prefrontal cortex 442 6.84 23 53 31
6.01 212 53 43
4.99 6 65 13
Left inferior frontal gyrus 68 6.40 251 20 7
5.52 257 23 19
Right cerebellum 120 5.71 24 282 238
Left temporoparietal junction 211 5.06 260 258 19
3.91 248 258 22
Right medial cerebellum 33 5.00 3 258 250
Right inferior frontal gyrus 46 4.97 48 23 214
4.49 60 26 7
Precuneus 101 4.74 23 252 28
3.87 23 261 34
c) Interaction: Social agent * knowledge [(BodiesTraits>BodiesNeutral)> (NamesTraits>NamesNeutral)]
Left temporal pole 24 4.16 251 21 235
Right superior medial prefrontal cortex 33 4.04 9 50 28
Left superior medial prefrontal cortex 12 3.53 29 32 55
Left temporoparietal junction 15 3.48 248 264 31
The main effect of social agent (Bodies>Names) is masked by the body-localiser (Bodies>Cars); the main effect of social knowledge (Traits>Neutral) is masked by the
ToM-localiser (False Beliefs>False Photographs); the social agent by social knowledge interaction [(BodiesTraits>BodiesNeutral)> (NamesTraits>NamesNeutral)] is
masked by both the body and ToM localiser.
Note: Regions surviving a voxel-level threshold of P<0.005 and 10 voxels are reported. Areas in bold survive FWE cluster correction for multiple comparisons.
Subclusters at least 8 mm from the main peak are listed. The social agent by social knowledge interaction is exclusively masked by the NamesNeutral>NamesTraits
contrast to make sure that any interaction result does not include (Neutral>Traits) when paired with names.
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Interaction. For the interaction between social agent and social
knowledge [(BodiesTraits>BodiesNeutral)> (NamesTraits>
NamesNeutral)] clusters emerged in left TPJ, mPFC, and left
TP and all of these clusters overlapped with the ToM-localiser
at the group-level (Table 1; Figure 3C). The parameter esti-
mates illustrate a greater difference between trait and neu-
tral statements when bodies rather than names are
presented. More specifically, the effect of social knowledge
(Traits>Neutral) is present for both social agents, but it is
greater for bodies than names. These results demonstrate that
brain regions defined by being engaged in reasoning about
others’ mental states (social knowledge) emerge for the inter-
action term of the main task.
We also predicted that the person perception network would
be engaged for the same interaction analysis, but we did not find
this pattern of response at the initial threshold. To further
explore this null result in EBA and FBA, we investigated the
interaction term in body-selective regions at a more liberal
threshold (P< 0.05, k¼ 10). Using this less conservative threshold,
right FG showed the predicted interaction pattern and this cluster
overlapped with the body-localiser (Supplementary Figure S1
and Table S2). In addition, there was a response in left middle
temporal gyrus, but the location of this response was superior
(z¼ 19) to the typical location of EBA or FBA. Due to the chance
of the univariate response in right FG being a false positive,
any interpretation is necessarily cautious. However, the
main reason for performing the univariate interaction analysis
was to identify seed regions that can be used subsequently
to test our primary hypothesis using functional connectivity
analyses. If the result in right FG is a false positive and it does
not reflect the linking of body and trait information, then we
should expect no functional coupling between right FG and the
ToM-network in the functional connectivity analyses. The
inverse interaction contrast [(NamesTraits>NamesNeutral)>
(BodiesTraits>BodiesNeutral)] is reported in Supplementary
Table S1.
PPI analyses
Coordinates of overlap within individual participants were
identified in left TPJ (n¼ 17), mPFC (n¼ 17), left TP (n¼ 15) and
right FG (n¼ 19) (for more details, see Supplementary Table S3).
Our prediction was that person perception and person
knowledge networks would show coupling as a function of our
task. To test this prediction, for each seed region separately, we
used the same interaction term for our PPI analysis as was
previously used in the univariate analysis [(BodiesTraits>
BodiesNeutral)> (NamesTraits>NamesNeutral)].
Both right FG and left TP showed the predicted pattern of func-
tional coupling with person perception or knowledge networks
(Table 2; Figure 4). Figure 4A shows that the response in left TPJ
and bilateral TP has greater functional coupling with right FG
when social knowledge (Trait>Neutral) is present for bodies, but
not names. Additionally, these clusters all overlapped with the
ToM-localiser. As such, there is overlap between the clusters that
show coupling with right FG when inferring a trait about a body
and when reasoning more generally about others’ mental states.
In addition, left TP showed greater functional coupling with a
region of left FG when social knowledge (Trait>Neutral) is present
for bodies, but not names (Figure 4B). Furthermore, this cluster in
left FG overlapped with the body-localiser. As such, there is over-
lap between a cluster that shows coupling with left TP when infer-
ring a trait about a body and when perceiving bodies in general.
The other seed regions, left TPJ and mPFC, did not show the
predicted pattern of functional coupling with person perception
networks. Therefore, the pattern of functional coupling observed
between person perception and person knowledge networks when
linking a trait to a body is not a general one that applies to every re-
gion within these two networks; instead, it is specifically tied to bi-
lateral FG and parts of the ToM-network (left TPJ and bilateral TPs).
Discussion
When being introduced to someone, one forms an impression
based on what you’ve heard about her character (e.g. ‘She volun-
teers in a hospital’) as well as her physical appearance (e.g. tall
and thin). Although much research has investigated the neural cir-
cuits involved in perceiving what another person looks like (per-
son perception), as well as what one knows about that person
(person knowledge), it is unclear how the human brain links these
different pieces of information about a person’s identity together.
We demonstrate that anatomically and functionally distinct brain
circuits exchange signals during the formation of identity repre-
sentation. Specifically, brain circuits that represent aspects of an-
other person’s physical appearance, such as body shape and
posture, are linked to brain circuits that engage when reasoning
about another person’s trait-based character, such as whether
they are friendly, helpful or generous. These data support the view
that a ‘who’ system for social cognition spans perceptual and in-
ferential mechanisms and that these mechanisms communicate
to each other when forming a representation of another’s identity.
Limitations and future directions
From our results we cannot infer whether the observed func-
tional connectivity profile is tied to a particular person (i.e. per-
son-specific) in addition to being tied to a particular form (i.e.
body more than name). Given the trial-unique combinations of
social agents and social knowledge, it is plausible that the re-
sults reflect person-specific representations. However, from our
results alone, we cannot rule out the possibility that our results
solely reflect a more generic category-level representation (i.e.
body more than name). In addition, previous research has
shown that mPFC is sensitive to person-specific information
(Hassabis et al., 2014; Welborn and Lieberman, 2014). Future
Table 2. Clusters revealed in the PPI analysis for the social agent
by social knowledge interaction [(BodiesTraits>BodiesNeutral)>
(NamesTraits>NamesNeutral)], which is masked by both the body
and ToM localiser
Region Number
of voxels
T Montreal Neurological
Institute coordinates
x y z
Seed region: right fusiform gyrus
Right temporal pole 11 4.23 51 11 238
Left temporoparietal junction 17 3.79 260 252 19
2.98 260 246 19
Left temporal pole 14 3.75 245 20 223
3.28 245 17 232
Left temporal pole 12 3.53 233 5 226
2.63 242 2 226
Seed region: left temporal pole
Left fusiform gyrus 11 4.05 245 249 226
Note: Regions surviving a voxel-level threshold of P< 0.005 and 10 voxels are re-
ported. These results are exclusively masked by the NamesNeutral>
NamesTraits PPI contrast to make sure that any interaction result does not in-
clude (Neutral>Traits) when paired with names.
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work, therefore, could adapt the methods developed here to dir-
ectly test the degree to which person perception and knowledge
networks interact at different levels of person-specificity.
One possible limitation to our interpretation relates to the
familiarity of names that we used, which prior work has investi-
gated (Sugiura et al. 2006). All names in this study were unfamil-
iar to participants and as such it could have been more difficult
to assign social knowledge to names than bodies. However, this
difference is unlikely to explain our results for two reasons. Our
main findings involve an interaction between agent and know-
ledge. Therefore, a greater difficulty assigning knowledge
to names in general would apply to both types of knowledge
(trait-based and neutral), rather than being preferentially tied to
trait-based judgments more than neutral judgements. In add-
ition, by using functional localisers, it becomes more difficult
for a difference in difficulty alone to explain why body-selective
patches were linked to the person knowledge network, unless
body-selective areas are also involved for difficult of processing
per se.
We also acknowledge limits to our methodology and design,
which future work can build upon. First, functional connectivity
analyses provide no direct insight into the underlying neural
pathway that controls functional coupling between brain areas.
As such, using measures of structural connectivity, it would be
Fig. 3. Results from the univariate analysis. (A) The main effect of Social Agent (Bodies>Names) revealed clusters of activity in bilateral OT cortices and bilateral FG.
These clusters overlapped with the EBA and FBA as identified with the body-localiser (Bodies>Cars: green). Overlap is shown in yellow. (B) The main effect for Social
Knowledge (Traits>Neutral) revealed clusters of activity in mPFC, bilateral TPs, precuneus and left TPJ. These clusters overlapped with the ToM-network as identified
with the ToM-localiser (False Beliefs>False Photographs: blue). Overlap is shown in pink. (C) The Social Agent by Social Knowledge interaction
([BodiesTraits>BodiesNames]> [NamesTraits>NamesNeutral]) revealed a clusters in mPFC, left TP, and left TPJ, which overlapped with the ToM-localiser (overlap is
shown in pink). Parameter estimates were extracted from a 4 mm sphere around the peak coordinate Abbreviations: EBA, extrastriate body area; FBA, fusiform body
area; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; TP, temporal pole; mPFC, medial prefrontal junction.
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valuable for future research to investigate the neural pathways
that underlie functional relationships between person percep-
tion and person knowledge systems. Second, it is conceptually
possible that trait information is linked to names through func-
tional links between the ToM-network and a neural representa-
tion of names. For instance, there may be functional links
between ToM areas and a brain area processing words, such as
the Visual Word Form Area (VWFA; Szwed et al., 2011). However,
we do not have the same grounds for hypothesising links be-
tween the ToM-network and a ‘name’ system, as we do for links
with body patches. In contrast to EBA and FBA, which show cat-
egory-selectivity for bodies, there is no evidence that the VWFA,
or any other set of brain regions, shows the same category-
selectivity for names (more than other words). In addition, we
did not design the study to test for neural links between the
ToM-network and a neural representation of names. To do so,
we would have needed a relevant localiser in order to accur-
ately locate the VWFA in each individual participant (Glezer
and Riesenhuber, 2013). This study, therefore, was not designed
to address neural links between the representation of
names and traits. These caveats aside, the interaction contrast
that tests for clusters showing a greater response for trait
inferences (Traits>Neutral) when reading a name compared
with observing a body, showed no engagement of ToM-network
or any clusters with coordinates near VWFA (Supplementary
Table S1C). As such, the limited evidence we do have from
the current study regarding this issue is not consistent with
neural links between the ToM-network and the VWFA, but
much more work is needed to pursue this line of research
directly.
Fig. 4. Results from the PPI analysis. Seed regions were identified based on clusters emerging from the social agent by social knowledge interaction at the univariate
level (including right FG—see Supplementary Table S1). These regions were either part of the person perception network (right FG) or person knowledge network
(mPFC, left TP and left TPJ) as defined by body and ToM localisers, respectively. In four separate PPI analyses, each identified region from the univariate analysis was
used as a seed region with the social agent by social knowledge interaction term as the contrast of interest. Clusters emerging from these analyses reveal the strength
of correlation over time between activity in that cluster and that in the seed region as a function of the task. These PPI parameter estimates are extracted from a 4-mm
sphere around the peak coordinate. (A) PPI analyses revealed that seed region right FG (solid yellow circle) showed functional coupling with nodes within the person
knowledge network. Clusters in left temporoparietal junction and bilateral TP showed greater functional coupling with right FG when inferring traits about bodies than
names (shown in red). These areas overlapped with the ToM-localiser (shown in blue; overlap is shown in pink). (B) PPI analyses revealed that seed region left TP (solid
yellow circle) showed functional coupling with left FG (shown in red). This area overlapped with the body-localiser (shown in green; overlap shown in yellow).
Abbreviations: FG, fusiform gyrus; lTPJ, left temporoparietal junction; TP, temporal pole.
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Implications for neural circuits subserving person
perception and person knowledge
Coupling of functional responses between distinct brain circuits
suggests that person perception and person knowledge net-
works are not completely encapsulated and resistant to influ-
ence from other brain systems. Downing and Peelen (2011)
proposed that the primary function of EBA and FBA is to per-
form a visual analysis of bodies, but that these regions also ex-
change signals with other brain circuits. This study, as well as
others (Ewbank et al., 2011; Quadflieg et al., 2011; Zimmermann
et al., 2013), are beginning to provide empirical support for this
view by demonstrating that interactions between neural sys-
tems that are part of a broader cognitive landscape may upregu-
late or downregulate the response in body-selective cortex.
Linking person perception and person knowledge
during social interactions
Neuroimaging research has identified patches of cortex select-
ive for the perception of faces, bodies, and places as well as for
thinking about other people’s thoughts (Downing et al., 2001;
Spiridon et al., 2006; Kanwisher, 2010). Although these data have
provided evidence for functional segregation within the human
brain, it has not been clearly established how neural signals
across multiple sites are integrated (Friston and Price, 2001;
Friston et al., 2003). In the current experiment, we show that
perceptual signals in the ventral visual stream are linked with
inferential signals in the ToM-network. Specifically, we show
that parts of the FG, which are involved in processing body
shape and posture (Downing and Peelen, 2011), exchange sig-
nals with TPJ and TPs, which form part of a circuit that is
involved in making inferences about others’ thoughts and traits
(Frith and Frith, 1999; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Mitchell, 2009;
Van Overwalle, 2009). Moreover, we show that this exchange of
signals is specifically tuned to situations when one is con-
fronted with a combination of information that is relevant for
both person perception and person knowledge networks (i.e.
bodies, not names; traits, not neutral statements). As such, the
pattern of functional connectivity is not generic to any form of
social agent, such as someone we may read about in a novel; in-
stead, it is tuned to an inference that is coupled to a body more
than a name. On a broader level, these results provide empirical
evidence to support the view that a ‘who’ system for social cog-
nition, which establishes and maintains a global representation
of another’s identity, comprises category-specific brain circuits
that exchange signals (Haxby et al., 2000; Ishai 2008; Moeller
et al. 2008; Ramsey et al., 2011; Collins and Olson, 2014).
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